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MAJOR COURT DECISIONS9 2003
RUGGIERO v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir.
2003)
Issue: Whether the character qualifications in
the Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000) violate
the First Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States?
Holding: Denying the petition to review, the
court ruled that the Radio Broadcasting Preserva-
tion Act ("RBPA") does not on its face violate the
First Amendment.
Discussion: Congress, in response to overwhelm-
ing numbers of pirated Low-Power FM ("LPFM")
radio stations, passed the RBPA, which prohibited
an applicant for a LPFM station from receiving a
license if he or she had ever operated a pirated
broadcast station in violation of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). Believing the
character qualifications were a content-based re-
striction, Ruggiero urged the court to apply inter-
mediate scrutiny. The Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") asserted that the character
qualifications need only to withstand rational ba-
sis review. The court decided that a standard of
review somewhere between minimal scrutiny and
intermediate scrutiny was appropriate. The court
agreed with the FCC's assessment that the charac-
ter qualifications were unconnected to any con-
tent that an applicant had or might broadcast.
The qualifications related to the applicant operat-
ing an illegal broadcast station. The court, how-
ever, also ruled that the ineligibility of an appli-
cant to ever obtain an LPFM license made ra-
tional basis review not stringent enough to protect
First Amendment rights. In ruling against Rug-
giero, the court determined that there is a reason-
able fit between the character qualifications and
the government interest in protecting the air-
waves from unlicensed broadcast stations.
Summarized by: Jared Weaver
TING v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003)
Issue Whether Sections 201(b) and 202(a) of
the Communications Act preempt the application
of state consumer protection and contract laws to
contracts established by telecommunications car-
riers with their residential customers.
Holding. Sections 201 (b) and 202(a) do not pre-
empt the application of state law because state law
is now the congressionally intended method by
which to enforce the purposes of those sections.
Discussion: The court determined that the appli-
cable preemption test was whether there is actual
conflict between federal and state law, such that
compliance with state law is an obstacle to accom-
plishment and execution of Congress's purposes
in enacting the federal law. In order to deter-
mine whether there is such conflict, the court
must look at both the objective of the federal law
and the method Congress chose to achieve that
objective. As combined, the two sections of the
Communications Act demonstrate Congress' in-
tent that "customers receive fair and reasonable
rates from telecommunications carriers." 319
F.3d at 1138. Before the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 ("1996 Act") this congressional intent was
carried out by the filed rate doctrine, which guar-
anteed-through mandatory filing of rates with
the FCC-one published rate to all customers in a
given area. Through the 1996 Act, Congress elim-
inated the filing required, and thus eliminated
the only method of enforcing the intent ex-
pressed in Sections 201(b) and 202(a). The cen-
tral purpose of the 1996 Act was detariffing-to
"replace the old monopoly-based regime with one
based on market competition" in order to depart
"from traditional 'regulatory' ways that coddled
monopolies." Id. at 1141, 1143 (citations omit-
ted). The 1996 Act's provisions are intended to
be safeguarded by a competitive market that by its
very nature will maintain reasonable service rates,
and "this market-based method depends in part
on state law for the protection of consumers." Id.
at 1141. California's consumer protection and
contract laws do not interfere with Congress's
objectives and method.
Summarized by: Samantha Castronovo
BRAND X NTERNET SERVICES V. FCC, 345
F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003)
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Issue: Whether the court's prior interpretation
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in AT&T
v. City of Portland controls review of the FCC's de-
cision to classify Internet service provided by cable
companies exclusively as an interstate "informa-
tion service."
Holding: The court held that AT&T v. City of
Portland's interpretation remains binding in the
circuit, even in light of the FCC's contrary inter-
pretation of the 1996 Act, and cable broadband
service was not a "cable service" but instead was
part "telecommunications service" and part "in-
formation service." Affirmed in part, vacated in
part and remanded.
Discussion: Petitions were filed by corporations,
organizations, and the State of California seeking
review of the FCC's Declaratory Ruling that cable
modem service was not a "cable service," but was
classified as an interstate "information service"
within the meaning of the 1996 Act. See In re In-
quiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the In-
ternet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17
F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002).
Brand X, Earthlink, the State of California and
the Consumer Federation of America argued that
cable modem service is both an information ser-
vice and a telecommunications service, and is
therefore subject to regulation on a common car-
riage basis, meaning that cable broadband provid-
ers must be required to let other ISPs use their
facilities. The National League of Cities, the Na-
tional Association of Telecommunications Of-
ficers and Advisors, the United States Conference
of Mayors, the National Association of Counties,
the Texas Coalition for Cities for Utilities Issues,
and others argued that cable modem service is
both an information service and a cable service,
and therefore is subject to regulation by local au-
thorities as provided in the 1996 Act. Finally, Ver-
izon argued that the FCC Declaratory Ruling was
correct, but that the FCC should have also ruled
that digital subscriber line ("DSL") service pro-
vided by telephone companies, like cable modem
service, is an information service.
In AT&T v. Portland, the court held that cable
modem service is not exclusively an information
service, but contains a "transmission element"
that is a "telecommunications service." The court
held that it was bound by its decision in Portland
under the doctrine of stare decisis. The two sepa-
rate concurring opinions reflected the views of
the authors, and not the court.
Summarized by: Megan Wilson
GA. POWER CO. v. TELEPORT COMM.
ATLANTA, INC., 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 19989
(11th Cir. 2003)
Issue Plaintiff in this case, Georgia Power Com-
pany ("Georgia Power") raises several issues for
review in attempting to identify the errors in the
FCC's final order affirming the decision to reduce
Georgia Power's pole attachment rates imposed
by the Cable Services Bureau in favor of Teleport
Communications Atlanta ("Teleport"). The issues
presented for review include: whether the FCC's
placing burden of proof on Georgia Power to es-
tablish the average number of attaching entities
and subsequent acceptance of Teleport's stan-
dard, though lacking factual support, was arbi-
trary and capricious; whether FCC acted in an ar-
bitrary and capricious manner in "independently
adopting" rebuttable presumptions as to the aver-
age number of entities allowed in pole attach-
ment and applying that standard to Georgia
Power; whether the FCC's refusal to allow addi-
tional evidence from Georgia Power regarding av-
erage number of attaching entities was arbitrary
and capricious; whether FCC's definition of "at-
taching entities" for determining the telecommu-
nications rate was contrary to the plain language
of the Pole Attachments Act; whether FCC's asser-
tion of jurisdiction prior to formal negotiations
between Georgia Power and Teleport was, again,
in violation of the plain language of the 1996 Act;
and whether the FCC had committed a taking of
property by failing to provide Georgia Power with
just compensation for its property.
Holding The court denied Georgia Power's pe-
tition to review an FCC order which affirmed the
decision of the FCC's Cable Service Bureau to
substantially reduce Georgia Power's annual pole
rental rate. First, the court held that by failing to
supply the FCC with the methodology and under-
lying data that supported its rate, Georgia Power
failed to carry its burden to justify its pole attach-
ment rate and the information provided was
based on only on data favorable to Georgia
Power. Next, the court held that the FCC's "inde-
pendent adoption of an average number of at-
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tachers" was not retroactive rulemaking because it
did not impose liability for past conduct. The
court also held that the FCC's denial of Georgia
Power's motion to provide additional evidence re-
garding the average number of attachers was not
arbitrary and capricious, but discretionary in ac-
cordance with statute. Additionally, the court de-
ferred to the FCC's interpretation of 47 U.S.C.
Section 224(e) and found the FCC's interpreta-
tion of "attaching entitities" reasonable. As for
further negotiations between Georgia Power and
Teleport, the court agreed with the FCC's conclu-
sion that further negotiations would be inconse-
quential due to Georgia Power's unilateral at-
tempt to fix the price for pole attachment. Fi-
nally, the court held that the 1996 Act's mandated
telecom rate provided Georgia Power with just
compensation for use of its tower and rejected the
claim.
Discussion: The court found that Georgia Power
had the burden to supply the FCC with informa-
tion to justify its pole attachment rate. Georgia
Power based its pole attachment rate on replace-
ment cost theory which was more favorable to
Georgia Power's position rather than the FCC's
historic cost methodology. Therefore, the court
found that the FCC was correct in finding that
Georgia Power failed to meets its burden of sup-
plying the methodology and underlying data to
support its rate. In finding that the FCC's "inde-
pendent adoption of an average number of at-
tachers" was not rulemaking, the court found it
reasonable for the FCC to rely upon information
it developed during the rulemaking for In re Im-
plementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996, 16 F.C.C.R. 12,103
(2001).
In regards to the FCC's denial of Georgia
Power's motion seeking supplemental submis-
sions related to its rate calculations, the court
found nothing arbitrary or capricious about the
FCC's decision. The court acknowledged the
FCC's well-established procedure regarding sup-
plemental submissions in pole attachment dis-
putes and found that while the FCC rules allow
for additional filings, the rules are merely permis-
sive, not mandatory.
In regards to Georgia Power's attack on the
FCC's definition of the term "attaching entities,"
the court used the two-step analysis from Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. National Res. Def. Council, Inc., 47
U.S. 837 (1984). Under the first prong of Chevron,
the court found that the term "attaching entity" is
ambiguous as defined in 47 U.S.C. Section
224(e). The second prong of Chevron calls on the
court to defer to the agency's interpretation as
long as that interpretation is reasonable. The
court found the FCC's interpretation of the stat-
ute, that Congress would not have used the gen-
eral term "entity" in 47 U.S.C. Section 224(3) if it
meant to limit the term "attaching entity" to only
cable and telecom providers, "eminently" reasona-
ble. Additionally, Georgia Power argued that the
FCC intervened prematurely by not allowing "real
negotiations" between the parties before ruling
on Teleport's complaint. The court agreed with
the FCC that the parties' positions had 'jelled"
and that further negotiations would be fruitless.
The court relied on Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311
F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002) to find that Georgia
Power was justly compensated for the taking man-
dated by the 1996 Act. The court analogized that
if Alabama Power Co. was justly compensated by
the 1996 Act's mandated cable rate, which is a
lower rate than the mandated telecom rate, then
Georgia Power was adequately compensated by
the mandated telecom rate.
Summarized by: J Andrew Reynolds
VONAGE HOLDINGS CORP. V. MINNESOTA
PUB. UTIL.'S COMM'N, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18451 (D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2003).
Issue. Does Vonage, a provider of voice over In-
ternet protocol ("VoIP"), provide an information
service or a telecommunications service?
Holding. Ruling that Vonage does not provide a
telecommunications service, the court found that
the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission
("MPUC") does not have the authority to regulate
VoIP because Congress has not provided any stat-
utory intent to regulate it. The court, in turn,
granted Vonage's motion for a preliminary in-
junction, preventing the MPUC's order requiring
Vonage to comply with Minnesota's telecommuni-
cations statutes and rules.
Discussion: The court determined that VolP is
an information service because it offers the "capa-
bility for generating, acquiring, storing, trans-
forming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or mak-
ing available information via telecommunica-
20041
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tions .... ." 47 U.S.C. Section 153 (20). Bolstering
its argument that VoIP is an information service,
the court ruled that VoIP did not meet the FCC's
four phone-to-phone IP telephony conditions,
which may have rendered VoIP as a telecommuni-
cations service. The court then asserted that Con-
gress has drawn a distinction between telecommu-
nications and information services and has de-
cided that the latter remain unregulated. As an
information service, VoIP-according to the
court-should remain unregulated, thus leaving
the court to conclude that federal and state law
conflict and pre-emption is necessary.
Summarized by: Jared Weaver
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